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ABSTRACT 
     Golo Mann, who is recognized in a recent article as one of the first historians to realize that 
their work “does not reproduce ‘what actually happened’ so much as represent it from a 
particular point of view (Burke, “History of Events” 290), describes the ideal historian as 
someone who must “swim with the stream of events” and tell the story as if he was there when 
the events occurred while analyzing them as an outside “better informed observer.”  In 
combining these two methods, the historian must be sure to “yield a sense of homogeneity […] 
without the narrative falling apart” (Mann 7).   
     While most contemporary criticism surrounding Herman Melville’s Moby-Dick focuses on 
various metaphorical readings, if we return to a more literal reading we see that Ishmael is 
Mann’s ideal historian.  Not only is Ishmael carried along with the events “as though he was 
present” (7), he actually was present, and he does return to the events a later, better informed 
observer.  With this in mind, an often decried literal reading of Moby-Dick adds to the current 
metaphorical scholarship because it sees Ishmael as a common man in a rapidly chancing society 
and explores how that man comes to terms with his own existence in such an impersonal world. 
     However, because Ishmael is unsure of how to deal with the events of his past and how to 
capture the meaning of those events on paper, he has problems with what Mann calls the 
“homogeneity” of his history and cannot keep his narrative from falling apart.  Through an 
analysis of the similarities and differences of the assumptions underlying both the creation of 
history and the creation of fiction, and a subsequent look at how those conventions are both 
obeyed and subverted in Moby-Dick, we can enhance an understanding of Melville’s novel as 
the narrator’s attempt to come to terms with his own traumatic past.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
“Loomings” 
 
     Much of the Moby-Dick scholarship of the past twenty years has focused on metaphorical 
interpretations of Melville’s novel concerning many different subjects.  In his 1986 book, Moby-
Dick: Ishmael’s Mighty Book, Kerry McSweeney mentions that scholarship has already begun to 
emphasize readings dealing with the novel’s commentary on “nineteenth-century America’s 
commercial expansion” as well as its “prophetic criticism of unbridled industrialization and 
predatory capitalism” (3).  To be sure, the trend in examining Moby-Dick as an allegorical study 
of nineteenth-century America as opposed to a literal whaling sea-adventure has continued.  In 
Fred Bernard’s 2002 article “The Question of Race in Moby-Dick”, Bernard poses the possibility 
that both Ishmael and Ahab are mulatto and the Pequod’s northbound pursuit of whales in the 
Pacific is an oceangoing metaphor for slave hunters chasing and tormenting fugitive slaves 
fleeing north in the wake of the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act (392).  Ian McGuire also interprets the 
novel in terms of the nineteenth-century American issues surrounding race, slavery, and labor in 
his 2003 article, “‘Who ain’t a slave?’: Moby-Dick and the Ideology of Free Labor.”  There have 
even been studies done about the possible homosexual relationship between Herman Melville 
and Nathaniel Hawthorne and the influences of that relationship on the composition of Moby-
Dick.1 
     While these are all examples of viable, and often persuasive, interpretations about Herman 
Melville’s nineteenth-century masterpiece, they ignore the fact that Moby-Dick is but one of 
many products of the “great age of the realistic novel” (McSweeney 10).  And while much of the 
                                                 
1 See Michael Bronski’s “When Nathaniel Met Herman” for an example. 
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current scholarship has moved past reading Moby-Dick literally as a story about Ishmael’s ill-
fated whaling voyage, this interpretation does not necessitate the denial of Moby-Dick as a 
metaphorical work.  What it does demand is that we see in the literal whaling voyage Melville’s 
attempt to show one man’s coming to terms with his own existence in a turbulent world which 
seems to remove the his own free will and place him in the whimsical hands of fate and 
tyrannical rulers. 
     In what he calls an “attempt to see what is being done in this book and perhaps why it is being 
done” (5), in 2001 E.L. Doctorow said that due to the habitual fluctuations of narrative, one can 
“make a case for Moby-Dick as a road novel” (9).  In support of this claim, Mark Dunphy has 
argued in a 2002 article that “Moby-Dick can be viewed as the ur-Beat novel for On the Road” 
(1).  Dunphy claims that Ishmael is one of the literary forefathers of Sal Paradise, in that they are 
both “men alienated from their culture; and they take their ‘life on the road’ in search of self-
transformation and self-transcendence” (1).  To read Moby-Dick in this light, the novel becomes 
a coming-of-age tale for Ishmael, and can be seen as Ishmael’s cathartic act of trying to provide a 
sufficient explain for the events that happened on the Pequod “some years ago.”   
     While relying a reading of the novel that focuses on the literal whaling adventure may seem 
like a simpler method of interpreting Moby-Dick than the metaphorical readings of many 
contemporary scholars, it presents interesting questions of its own.  Though McSweeney argues 
that the novel is a product of nineteenth-century literary realism, he also admits that  
Moby-Dick is a boldly experimental work that anticipates some of the central techniques 
and devices of modernist and postmodernist prose fiction. […].  The novel ignores and/or 
subverts dominant nineteenth-century novelistic conventions and the assumptions that 
underlie them […]. (11) 
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One of the more problematic experiments of conventions for nineteenth-century audiences 
Melville makes in Moby-Dick is that of the narrator.  If we read Moby-Dick as the narrator’s 
road novel, and consequently as an attempt for him to create historical significance for the events 
he remembers, we also encounter specific problems of history formation because of Ishmael’s 
integration of what can only be called “factual information” into his fictional experience.   
     By “factual information” I mean extraliterary sources - information that exists in the world 
outside of the confines of fiction.  This includes information that readers perceive to be reality, 
which implies that it is something that Ishmael, as a fictional character, should not have access 
to.  For example, both readers contemporary to Melville and readers contemporary to this 
discussion are capable of differentiating between what exists in their conception of reality and 
what exists as fiction.  Because Ishmael is easily recognized to exist only on the level of fiction, 
but has knowledge of information that exists on the readers’ level of reality, the line between 
fiction and reality is blurred, which eventually harms the believability that Ishmael is trying to 
develop in order for him to come to terms with what he is telling. 
     Doctorow likens Ishmael’s use of extraliterary sources to another nineteenth-century 
American author, and in so doing grants Ishmael the type of existence that allows him a sort of 
“charactorial volition”:   
 Like E.A. Poe, [Ishmael] has a habit of citing extraliterary sources. […].  [A]mong Poe’s 
bad writing habits is his attempt to provide authority for the tale he is about to tell by 
citing factual precedents for it.  He begins “The Premature Burial,” for example, by citing 
three or four newspaper stories about people buried prematurely – just to establish that 
this sort of thing can happen. […].  It’s the fiction writer’s admission after all that he is 
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not a factualist, that he stands outside the culture of empirical truth.  And as such, it’s a 
fatally defensive  
move.  (11) 
Doctorow argues that there is a fundamental difference between what Poe does and what Ishmael 
does, however.  Because Ishmael “carr[ies] on to excess outside the novel,” his incorporation of 
extraliterary information is does not damage the believability of his narrative as it does Poe’s, 
who uses limited extraliterary sources (11).  In Doctorow’s mind, because Ishmael drowns his 
reader with this overwhelming tide of information, it makes his narrative more persuasive than 
Poe’s relatively timid offering of “factual evidence.” 
     This is where I disagree with Doctorow; I do not see the use of extraliterary sources as one of 
Poe’s “bad writing habits.”  Rather, Poe’s tentative justification of the plausibility of his fiction 
makes it more believable, while Ishmael’s flood of extraliterary information detracts from its 
believability because it excessively blurs the line between fiction and reality and never offers a 
clear representation of the experience the narrator seems to so desperately need to justify.    
     However, before I can discuss the narratorial conventions that Melville uses in Moby-Dick 
and how those conventions contribute to the problematic blurring of fiction and reality, I must 
first explain how what Ishmael is attempting to do as a character-narrator fits into the paradigm 
of the formation of history as well as the formation of fiction.  A discussion of this must 
invariably turn to an analysis of the assumptions underlying what is perceived as historical 
reality, and what goes into the construction of that reality as opposed to what goes into the 
construction of fiction.  Once this distinction is made, Ishmael’s identity and role as a character-
narrator can come into focus and fuel an understanding of what he may be attempting to do in the 
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divergent immensities of Moby-Dick as he works towards his own ideal self-realization through 
an understanding of his experience on the Pequod. 
 
In Search of Something True: History Versus Fiction 
 
     While a superficial understanding of fiction and history may suggest that the two exist on 
opposite sides of a fundamental spectrum of reality, there are numerous crucial intersections 
between fiction and the “reality” of historical narratives. Perhaps because of the relatively 
modern perception of reality as a subjective experience and the understanding that history is a 
construct imposed by a dominant culture open mainly to the interpretation of those in power, the 
aesthetic and structural worlds of history and fiction have begun to collide with more and more 
frequency.  One trend in historical scholarship over the past quarter-century that began with 
Hayden White is to recognize the similar goal of the writer of a novel and the composer of 
history; namely that they both want to project a “verbal image of ‘reality’” (White, Tropics 122).  
However, according to Lloyd Kramer, many historians contemporary to White resist his 
redefinition of the roles of the historian and fiction author “because they seem to lead straight 
into relativism and straight out of reality” (101). 
     Indeed, according to Lionel Gossman, the traditional image of “history and fictional story-
telling [is that they] confront and challenge each other at opposite poles of narrative practice” 
(10).  As such, fiction and history may be interpreted as two halves of a theoretical coin; if 
fiction is expressed “face up,” history must be kept “face down,” and vice versa.  
Philosophically, this “two-sided” distinction between history and fiction presupposes a 
fundamental duality of nature, a binary understanding of existence that relies on the assumption 
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that nothing exists as a singular absolute.  In Moby-Dick, Ishmael explains the concept in the 
simple terms of physicality: “[T]ruly to enjoy bodily warmth, some small part of you must be 
cold, for there is no quality in this world that is not what it is merely by contrast.  Nothing exists 
in itself” (61).  This distinction can be extended to the traditional understanding of the 
history/fiction binary.  According to Hayden White, 
 [In the early 1800s the thought was] to identify truth with fact and to regard fiction as the 
opposite of truth, hence as a hindrance to the understanding of reality rather than a way of 
apprehending it.  History came to be over against fiction, and especially the novel, as the 
representation of the “actual” to the representation of the “possible” or only 
“imaginable.” (Tropics 123) 
     However, the current ideological shift that attempts to encapsulate history and fiction together 
rejects the fundamental binary distinction of determinate existence.  If history is understood 
merely as a timeline that can approach objectivity because no opinion regarding the importance 
or meaning of those events is presented (though this relies on the questionable assumption that 
nothing is left out by conscious deletion or unconscious cultural repression), the picture that 
history paints is incomplete.  An event in itself, listed without any understanding of cause, 
outcome, or effect on the future, is relatively useless in the formulation of the current idea of 
“reality.”  Having a history that consists solely of a list of facts would not be acceptable as 
historical reality to one desiring a qualitative understanding of the history that the events outline.   
     Consider for effect a brief version of the history of the United States: Boats arrive from 
Europe; Conflicts with native groups; Conflicts with ruling European countries; Revolutionary 
War; Conflicts over State’s Rights and Slavery; Civil War; Industrialization; World War I; Stock 
Market Crash; World War II; Conflicts over Civil Rights; Vietnam War; Present Day.  One could 
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argue that this is an acceptable list of the major events in U.S. history, but by this list alone it 
appears that American history is characterized entirely by periods of civil unrest and war.  In this 
“objective” list, I have created a history of events that many people would have a problem with 
because there is no “explanation of their causes” – the second part of the definition of history.  
These same events may be, and are, included in an “acceptable” version of American historical 
reality that does not necessarily offend as many people as the preceding list if an explanation of 
their causes is provided.  The inclusion of an explanation is central to both history and fiction 
because, in creating the historical narrative that explains the events, historians are often involved 
in the formation of verbal fictions which are invented as readily as they are found and so share 
more similarities with literature than with the sciences (White, “Historical Text” 42).  While 
historical invention is tempered by the degree to which explanations are linked to the historical 
events, the historian invariably engages in invention when creating scenarios that link the events 
without being able to justify those links with verifiable events.  Were this not the case, and all 
historical narratives were passed through time in a complete form, history would become as 
objective and scientifically quantitative as the physical sciences.  However, because history is 
only passed through time in verifiable segments, the historian is forced to invent unifying 
causality in order to create a coherent linear history, and therefore shares conventions of 
invention with the author of fiction.  The fact that the invention of the historian is accepted as a 
version of reality while the invention of the author is not is at the heart of the distinction between 
history and literature.  The question must invariably turn to: what, then, shall we assume is real? 
     In The Social Construction of Reality, Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann define reality as 
“a quality pertaining to phenomena that we recognize as having a being independent of our own 
volition” (1).  In terms of historical reality, the “phenomena” must refer to the historical events, 
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those points on the quasi-objective timeline that historians impose meaning upon.  Those events 
become “real” when we accept that they occurred as the historian tells us they occurred.  Without 
our own direct knowledge, the historian acts as an intermediary on our behalf, and we accept his 
or her version of the events as having occurred though they are outside our realm of knowledge, 
or in Berger and Luckmann’s terminology, “our volition.”  Our personal belief systems and 
cultural upbringing also mediate our reception to created history, and any cultural or religious 
background we share with the historian increases the believability of a certain invented historical 
reality.   
     And while the general reader may not accept fiction as fact because of the fundamental 
difference between fiction and history, the line between the two is blurred when the author of 
fiction incorporates the same factual events and people as the historian into his or her fiction.  
Using these extraliterary sources brings the common binary distinction between history and 
fiction into question by mixing within the same narrative that which is understood to be real and 
that which is understood to be fictitious.  When the author of fiction introduces a character who 
becomes a narrator and creates his own version of reality, it becomes easier to make a clear 
distinction between the acceptable reality offered by the historian and the unacceptably fictitious 
reality of the character-narrator. 
 
Levels of Reality and the Formation of Historical Truth 
 
     While history contains some elements of fiction in the perpetuation of its particular image of 
reality, the fact that fiction may contain some elements of history does not necessitate that all 
works of fiction are, by default, works of history.  This even extends to works of fiction that deal 
 15 
with historically verifiable facts.  In his essay, “Narrative Form as a Cognitive Instrument,” 
Louis Mink holds that  
fiction may indeed be accurate in reporting some events, actions, and the details of life in 
a certain period, but we know this (and know that we know it), only because we can 
compare fiction with history, without doubting in principle which is which. (130)   
What Mink argues here is that while history and fiction may be using the same verifiable events 
and some of the same conventions in dealing with those events, there is some inherent distinction 
that differentiates history and fiction.   
     White provides one possibility for understanding the distinction between history and fiction 
by placing the responsibility for historical understanding on the shoulders of the historian as well 
as the reader.  Reality formation is then a joint venture by both the reader and the historian: 
“[F]or history both the structure of the narrative and its details are representative of past 
actuality; and the claim to be a true representation is understood by both the writer and reader” 
(Tropics 130).  The narrative structure and the details of history are set up from its inception to 
be understood as history by both the historian who must believe in the history he or she is setting 
forth, and the reader who is persuaded to accept the reality of the historian through the narrative 
but must be receptive to that version of reality in the first place.   
     The historian’s assumed belief in his story and the reader’s initial receptivity to that history is 
central when coupled with the notion that there is no inherent historical reality to any historically 
factual events.  Just because an event occurred does not automatically grant it status as a 
“historical event.”  Accepted versions of history are only created in retrospect; there is no fixed 
or predetermined meaning to facts or events.  When a significant event occurs, it is often referred 
to as “history in the making,” which implies that at a future time the event will be given 
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historical significance.  We can apply criteria from previous events that have been deemed 
“historical” to predict which current events will one day be granted this historicity based on 
shared attributes, but there is no immediate quality of history that can be ascribed to any singular 
event.  Thus, history is only given retrospective linguistic existence because after the passing of 
the physical occurrence the event only exists in language.   
       One of the most common examples of “history in the making” is trauma.  Traumatic events, 
especially those that occur on a national or world-wide scale, are often understood to be events 
that will be historicized even while they are occurring because many of the events we accept as 
historical share qualities of trauma.  Trauma also plays an important role in the progression of 
literature, because these events beg to be fictionalized as rapidly as they are converted into an 
historical reality.  According to White, 
 The greatest historians have always dealt with those events in the histories of their 
cultures that are “traumatic” […] events such as revolutions, civil wars, large-scale 
processes such as industrialization or urbanization, or institutions that have lost their 
original function in a society but continue to play an important role in the current social 
scene. (“Historical Texts” 51) 
     However, the designation of what is “traumatic” can be as subjective as history itself.  There 
is an assumption that trauma is an intrinsic quality that is immediately identifiable in certain 
events, generally revolving around the loss of life, property, or money.  But as White again 
makes clear, there is no historical event that can be “traumatic” of its own accord; there can only 
be a sense of trauma perceived in the context of the event by the historian’s narrative technique 
(47).  White’s view does not negate qualities of emotional trauma in favor of purely physically 
traumatic experiences, and it would be remiss not to recognize that people do experience 
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“traumas” that have profound and immediate effects on their lives.  But according to White’s 
interpretation of the positing of meaning on history, the creation of the sense of widespread 
trauma is contingent upon the repression of certain viewpoints while highlighting others.  In 
almost any instance, a tragic event can be turned into a joyous one by switching the viewpoints.  
For example, consider the Haitian coup d’etat and removal of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide.  
For Aristide’s supporters the coup was a national trauma, but for his opponents it was an event to 
be celebrated.  In any “traumatic” event, the group not adversely affected by the event may be 
able to empathize with those who are, but they do not see the event as inherently traumatic. 
     As Mink in “Narrative Form” and White in Tropics of Discourse have previously intimated, 
we see Lionel Gossman in “History and Literature: Reproduction or Signification” contend that 
the larger realm of history is given existence through linguistics: 
 One of the most effective and radical criticisms of historical realism has been made by 
highlighting the linguistic experience of historical narratives, by emphasizing that history 
constructs its objects, and that its objects are objects of language, rather than entities of 
which words are in some way copies.  From this point of view, the battle of Gettysburg, 
for instance, does not designate unproblematically something solid in reality that is prior 
to any naming of it.  The semiology of history, moreover, is more complex than language 
itself. (29) 
Essentially, Gossman is arguing that one of the most significant problems of history formation is 
that history does not exist as a physical entity, and the factual events of history cannot be proven 
because their physicality ends the moment the event is over.  In Gossman’s example of the battle 
of Gettysburg, he claims that the designation “the battle of Gettysburg” no longer refers to men 
physically fighting on a field in Pennsylvania – that reference was only good for the period in 
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time that the battle was taking place – but due to the nature of history, at that point the event was 
not historical.  So “the battle of Gettysburg” is now a signifier of an event that once occurred in 
reality but now only occurs through language.  The present language event, or signife, is now the 
historical reality and was created by the historian to correspond to the signifier.   
     This is complicated because, as opposed to the physical reality, the historical reality was 
never actual since it only ever exists in its linguistic form.  Gossman continues: 
In historical writing, the signs of language become signifiers in a secondary system 
elaborated by the historian.  What already has meaning at the level of language becomes 
an empty form again until, being brought into relation with an historically definable 
signife, or concept, it constitutes a new sign at a different level of meaning.  Historical 
discourse thus has the character of a language constructed out of material that is itself 
already a language. (29) 
The secondary level that Gossman refers to here can be linked to the secondary level of reality 
that exists in a fiction.  Imagine reality as a series of steps; the physical “actual” world exists on 
the bottom level.  Information about this primary level is gathered through language by those 
existing on the same level, but the physical reality of the level is verifiable.  The author or 
historian who exists on this level synthesizes the information gathered though language, and then 
turns around and uses the same language to create another reality on the second level.2  
Language is used in history as it is in fiction to create a world existing entirely of language – 
there is no physicality in the secondary level in either fiction or history.  One may be able to 
prove the existence of concepts, people, or events that are represented in the secondary level, but, 
in order to do so, one must return to the primary level and even then must rely heavily on 
language-based documents.  In some cases, one may prove historical physicality through 
                                                 
2 See Diagram 1: Secondary Level of Reality 
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photographs, ruins, or artifacts, but the narrative that creates the history from those articles 
invariably exists only in the realm of language because interpretive strategies for developing 
linear explanations for those artifacts must rely on a system of representations that is only 
perpetuated through language.  Therefore, the author or the historian must take information 
gathered though language and re-posit meaning into the information by packaging it in the 
language of the second level.   
     In “The Historical Text as Literary Artifact,” White tells us that while the historian is  
recycling information and repositioning it on the secondary level, he or she is invariably 
suppressing some events and highlighting others, evolving characterization, shifting tone and/or 
point of view, and shifting descriptive strategies – essentially all of the techniques that are 
generally used in the production of literature (47).  The historian is using all of these tools to 
“refamiliarize us with events that have been forgotten either through accident, neglect, or 
repression” (51).  However, because the historian must, consciously or unconsciously, repress 
some events in order to refamiliarize us with others, he or she is continually involved in 
subjective second-level history creation. 
     Because information-gathering on the primary level is never absolute or complete, the 
historian must turn to the major tool of the author of fiction – imagination.  According to 
Gossman, an emphasis is placed on the ever-increasing role of the historian’s individual aesthetic 
and moral sensibilities, social status, and, most importantly, his or her imagination in the 
“determination of the problem studied, and in the shaping of the historical narrative” (28).  But 
the use of the imagination must be tempered with the historian’s constant desire to know the past 
in the same way that the scientist wants to know the natural world; that is, objectively (29).  But 
because the imagination is a crucial element of the historian’s research, this objectivity can never 
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be completely achieved.  Fundamentally, then, even when dealing with the same issues and 
historical events, the historian is going through many of the same processes as the author of 
fiction, but the audience’s sense that the historian’s work is attempting to pursuade them to 
believe the reality it creates ultimately gives it more validity in a cultural understanding than the 
work of the author of fiction. 
     The reason that history and fiction can be discussed in this manner, and the reason for 
discussing the problems surrounding history creation in conjunction with understanding fiction, 
is touched on in Nielsen’s discussion of Dorrit Cohn’s The Distinction of Fiction: 
 A work of fiction creates the world to which it refers by referring to it.  […].  [Cohn] 
speaks of how fiction can still refer to the real world (14), but that this reference does not 
need to be precise or exclusive (15), and as a result the most important fact is left 
unmentioned: “the real world” outside the text and “the real world” as it is created in the 
text are by necessity not the same, and the world to which the text refers is nonetheless 
created in and by the reference of the text, even when the text contains characters, places, 
and occurrences that we know from “the real world.” (145) 
When we read a work of fiction we are invited transport ourselves to a world parallel to our own, 
a world that we understand does not exist in the same terms that ours does.  However, for the 
characters within the novel, the reality the author creates for them is their fundamental physical 
reality or “actuality.”  Recall that the author of fiction, like the historian, creates a reality based 
on language – to the characters formed within the confines of that language-based reality, the 
reality is not language based; it is their verifiable actuality.  We, as exterior readers, can never 
validate this reality because we do not exist on the same plane of verifiability that the characters 
do.   
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     However, while both the historian and the author of fiction create a reality based on language 
and use some of the same narrative conventions, some conventions are available to the author of 
fiction that are “off-limits” to the historian.  In “History of Events and the Revival of Narrative,” 
Peter Burke asserts,  
Some innovations are probably best avoided by historians.  In this group I would include 
the invention of someone’s stream of consciousness, useful as it might be, for the same 
reasons that have led historians to reject the famous classical device of the invented 
speech. (289) 
While the historian may be forced to subjectify history by engaging his or her imaginative 
creativity in order to explain the chronicle of events, he or she generally stops short of attempting 
to show interpersonal interaction, conversation, or thoughts, with the possible exception of when 
direct sources of such information exists.  Doing so would blur the distinction between history 
and fiction, a distinction that Louis Mink claims is integral for the integrity of historiography.  
This leads to one of the most prominent distinctions between the historian and the author of 
fiction; the author can create the conversations between the characters involved in a historical 
event in order to explain, fictitiously but often logically, the reasons behind the events, and the 
personal motivations of those perpetuating and affected by those events.  The historian often 
relies on a putatively impersonal representation of the events, which hides the subjectivity of 
history through a scientific tone which begs to be interpreted as objective and therefore 
believable.  Some historians “go so far as to dismiss what they call ‘intentionalism’ altogether” 
and view the motivations and drives of historical figures as virtually insignificant (Burke, “New 
History” 16).  The author of fiction, conversely, has the ability to set up personal relationships 
between the characters within the events which make them more “human” because we can 
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identify with their motivations and desires in situations similar to our own personal experiences. 
This provides a means for some readers to connect with the characters in such a way that they are 
invited to insert themselves into the second-level reality of fiction, which consequently indicates 
strong subjectivity and thereby differentiates between the fiction and the history.  This fiction 
may function as reality in the sense that the reader who connects with the character emotionally 
commits to the story and may even recognize some facts as having a historical existence, but the 
subjectivity of the created interpersonal atmosphere destroys any semblance of historical 
actuality. 
     This scenario is further complicated when the story is not told through the author or an 
impersonal narrator, but rather through a character within the frame of the fiction itself.  When 
dealing with an author from the primary level of reality telling a story on the second, it is 
possible to forge a connection with the characters that allows some degree of acceptance of the 
story because there is a connection not only with the characters but also with the author.  We 
know that we, as readers, and the author both exist on the same primary plane of reality.  When 
the primary-level author creates a fiction that draws on extratextual reality of the first level, we 
can accept some things because we know that we have access to the same knowledge of actuality 
as the author.  Recall Doctorow’s example concerning Poe cited above; a contemporary reader 
with access to a database of nineteenth-century newspapers can verify the articles Poe includes 
about stories of people being buried alive.  This theoretical verifiability promotes a sense of 
security in reading that allows a degree of suspension of disbelief in the second-level story.  
However, when a character becomes the author and creates a history, there is no recourse to 
check the information that the character-author has because we do not both exist on the same 
plane of reality.  Because we can only accept information at our discretion that comes from the 
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primary author, when a character creates a history we can believe that there is a character telling 
a story, but we cannot commit to the reality that the character is trying to portray.  The character 
becomes an author, but is not reliable in the sense that we can rely unquestioningly on the story’s 
truth. 
     Returning to the image of the step-level understanding of narrative history, the character who 
exists as a construct of the language-based reality of the second level and tells a separate 
historical narrative winds up creating a third level of reality that is two steps removed from the 
actuality of the physical author and the physical reader.3  Examples of character-authors of this 
order include many first-person narrators, such as the many narrators in many of Faulkner’s 
Yoknatapawpha writings, Robert Walton from Shelly’s Frankenstein, and Ishmael from 
Melville’s Moby-Dick, discussed below.  In order to easily differentiate between the physical 
author and the character-author of the second level, I will henceforth refer to the physical author 
as the “Author” and the character-author as the “author.”  While the author may integrate some 
of the same events from verifiable first level actuality as the Author in an attempt to make his 
story or history seemingly verifiable, this attempt invariably fails.  While the author may be 
using extraliterary information, it is information that has been assimilated by the Author and 
recreated in the realm of language, which is not verifiable at all by the reader.  The fact that there 
is no reason to trust the author as reliable presents a problem for the acceptance of the author’s 
story and denigrates the suspension of disbelief that generally allows readers to become engulfed 
in the reality of the second level created by Authors.  In many second-level stories, a suspension 
of disbelief instills some connection between a reader and the secondary characters and events, 
even while the reader exists on the first level.  But when the author creates a story on the third 
                                                 
3 See Diagram 2: Third Level of Reality 
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level, the degree of separation between the reader and the author disallows a connection with the 
story which may be present in a second level story.   
     If we return to the Berger-Luckmann definition of reality, we see that in the second-level 
stories, because the audience is invited to suspend disbelief, it is understood that what is being 
told to them by the Author is independent of their own experience.  It becomes unclear that the 
story being told is actually being created by someone, and so it becomes burred with reality in 
the sense that appears to exist outside of the audience’s control.  But in the third-level stories the 
existence of the author as a character is obvious, and while the reality of that character is 
believable, it is always apparent that the story character is telling is the creation of a creation, and 
thus is too far removed from a verifiably acceptable reality to be believed.   
     To fully understand this, we must now answer the question of what can be verifiably, or 
objectively, known within the realm of fiction.  Since the second-level story is actually not 
something that can be verified but is acceptable nonetheless, what is it about this level that 
makes it fundamentally different from the third-level?  Why can information given about the 
second level be accepted as having an independent existence? 
     To answer this, consider religious texts, which are a singularly interesting case in terms of 
history and literature.  In many passages from the Judeo-Christian religious texts (I use this as an 
example merely due to personal knowledge, though almost any religious text could be used in its 
place), the form of the narrative reads more like fiction than history, though for centuries 
religious texts have been, and still are in some quarters, accepted as historical fact.  If the 
presence of dialogue or personal thoughts within the narrative is a qualification for fiction, how 
does one come to terms with the fact that the Bible has many stories that rely heavily on 
interpersonal interactions between the characters that the authors could have no knowledge of 
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but is still considered to be an objective compilation of historical actuality?  For some Christians, 
the answer to this question is God.  In many Christian churches, the Bible is referred to as “the 
word of God,” immediately giving validity to any passage from the book.  There need be no 
other proof for some Fundamentalist or Creationist Christians that the world was created in seven 
days other than the fact that the Bible says it was, and the Bible came from God, the ultimate 
authority over reality. 
     But in creating worlds, the God of creation has no more authority over objectivity than does 
the Author of a novel.  According to Martin Buber, “‘the establishment of a universe […] is the 
fundamental reality of existence’” (qtd. in Molinar 63).  Therefore, God has the ability to dictate 
objectivity in this world because He created this world.  In a strong sense, God is the Author of 
the first level of the three-level diagram of reality and the Author is the God of the second level. 4  
This theory does not advocate “Author-worship,” but it does rely on the premise that a reader has 
a degree, and any degree will do, of faith in the Author’s ability to create a fictional reality.  The 
reader need not believe in this reality as long as he or she believes that the Author can, and does, 
create it.  When a reader has this faith, whatever information that comes through the Author, 
usually personified through an impersonal narrator, can be understood as second-level objective 
reality.       
     What is understood as objective in the above description of second-level reality is relatively 
limited, however.  Because “objectivity” is a debatable concept, in the context of what can be 
“known” in fiction, objectivity must be ultimately based on physical experience.  In the “actual” 
world, objectivity is most easily described as information that one perceives through his or her 
own senses – we objectively know the world immediately around us.  Because we cannot 
physically enter the world of fiction, we are unable to get this same physical experience of that 
                                                 
4 See Diagram 3: God as First-Level Author 
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world, so the Author provides a surrogate sensory experience through the description of the 
setting.  The faith that accepts the Author as God of fiction allows the Author to neutrally 
describe the physical surrounding in such a way that it becomes objective through the reading, a 
concept I define as “neutreality.” 
     This neutreality is almost exclusively limited to third person narratives.  In first person 
accounts, the Author is removed from his or her creation, and the drive of the narrative rests on 
the shoulders of the “I” – a character that the Author has created.  Therefore, everything that we 
see, including description of setting, is colored through this character that is not in control of the 
environment in the same way that the Author is.  In fact, Wayne Booth has alleged that “the 
choice of the first person is sometimes unduly limiting; if the ‘I’ has inadequate access to 
necessary information, the author may be led into improbabilities” (150).  By “author” Booth is 
referring to the Author who exists on the first level, who may be “led into improbabilities” 
because of the inability to create a verifiable second-level reality.   
     Consider the difficulties of knowledge presented through the limitations of the first person 
narrator in Mary Shelly’s Frankenstein.  In Frankenstein, the information given comes through 
letters written by Robert Walton to a person he names Mrs. Saville.  Because the entire story is 
presented within the framework of a series of letters, one can never be completely sure of 
anything that is occurring.  The letters indicate that Robert Walton is stuck aboard a ship amidst 
an ice field and one day happens upon a man trapped on a floating ice block.  He and the crew 
take the man aboard and he eventually tells Walton his fantastic tale about creating a monster 
that he is now chasing across the Arctic; a story that Walton in turn writes down in letters, which 
is how we access it.  The main story of Frankenstein, the story of the creature, is then placed on a 
fourth level of reality because it is not only being told by a character on the second level, it could 
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be told by a character on the third level, since Frankenstein never directly appears in the text.  
There is nothing at all indicating that Frankenstein is not a figment of Walton’s imagination, 
which, if true, means that the creature is the figment (Frankenstein’s) of a figment (Walton’s) of 
a figment (Shelly’s) of imagination.  The only thing in Frankenstein that comes from the Author 
and therefore exists as neutreality is that there is someone who calls himself Robert Walton 
writing letters to someone he calls his sister.  There is no proof that Walton ever meets 
Frankenstein, or that he is even on a ship.  With the degree of insight and the apparently uncanny 
ability of Walton to remember Frankenstein’s story, it would not be unreasonable to assume that 
perhaps Walton is making the entire thing up, and nothing to indicate that he is not doing it from 
dry land – perhaps from an asylum.  While there is no proof that Walton is a lunatic and has 
created the fanciful story of the tormented scientist and his renegade monster, there is no proof 
that he is not.  Because Shelly never enters into her created reality and asserts herself as the God 
of that world, one is forced to be completely immersed in, at least, the third level of reality.  
Thus, this form of narrative history creation, since that is what the characters in the novel are 
essentially doing – creating a history – I shall call “total immersion history formation.” 
     While total immersion history formation may make for good fiction, it does not make for 
good history because the lack of seemingly acceptable objective information continually calls 
attention to the fictitiousness of the work.  Then question may then arise, what does the author of 
fiction care about the validity of history, and why is this discussion important for an 
understanding of Moby-Dick?  The answer to this question is found in the foreword to the 
English-language edition of Golo Mann’s history, Wallenstein, which was criticized by his 
German contemporaries as being literature: 
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 The historian has always to try to do two different things simultaneously.  He must swim 
through the stream of events, allowing himself to be carried along as though he had been 
present.  He must from outside converge on his subject from various directions, a later, 
better informed observer, and catechize it, yet never quite have it in the hollow of his 
hand.  How to combine these two methods so as to yield a semblance of homogeneity and 
without the narrative falling apart, that would be a man of letters’ concern.  (7) 
Mann here combines the roles of the historian and the “man of letters” into one discrete act, and 
this is precisely what the narrator attempts to do in Moby-Dick.  The narrator, calling himself 
Ishmael, attempts to return to the events of his past, “a later, better informed observer,” and 
contemplates it “from various directions” using various conventions of narrative.  In Mann’s 
eyes, Ishmael would be the ideal historian, and Moby-Dick should be the perfect history, but I 
will show that through the fluctuating narrative voice and the inconsistent observance of the 
levels of reality, Moby-Dick can be re-interpreted as the failed attempt to effectively come to 
terms with one’s troubling history.  
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THE PROBLEMATIC HISTORY OF THE PEQUOD 
 
What’s in a Name?: Clues to the Real Identity of “Ishmael” 
 
     With one of the most recognizable opening lines in American literature, “Call me Ishmael,” 
Herman Melville introduces his audience to a world wherein extraliterary truth and Ishmael’s 
“historical reality” are intertwined.  Because the narrator introduces himself as Ishmael from the 
outset and Melville does not provide any objective second-level information, Melville effectively 
bestows the power to create and control the literary universe on his fictitious narrator.  Unlike 
most first-person, present tense total immersion narratives wherein one is immersed in the 
secondary level of reality, when Melville immediately introduces a narrator who calls himself 
Ishmael, the narrative  jumps to the third level of reality because the story is told by a character-
narrator.  There is no evidence that Ishmael is this narrator’s name; in fact, it appears as though 
Ishmael is only a name assumed by the narrator for the purposes of telling his story.  Therefore, 
when Melville’s narrator, who exists on the second level of reality, begins to tell his history as 
Ishmael, he is creating a third level of reality for Ishmael.  In essence, though the narrator may 
have experienced the events he relates concerning the Pequod, he is not Ishmael.  Ishmael is a 
fictional representation of the self who embarked on the voyage of which he is the lone survivor.  
This understanding of Melville’s narrator presents tremendous problems for the acceptance of 
history formation in Moby-Dick because Ishmael repeatedly attempts to transcend the levels of 
reality in which he is confined.  While we may not know any information about the second level 
narrator thanks to Melville’s self-removal from Moby-Dick, we can come to some 
understandings of the second-level truth through Ishmael’s repeated historical transgressions.  
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     Edgar Dryden refers to Ishmael’s problematic name assumption in Melville’s Thematics of 
Form:  
In assuming a new name, especially one as heavily allusive as Ishmael, [the narrator] 
leaves behind his ‘own proper character’ along with the discarded patronym and takes on 
a whole new set of possibilities – in effect, occupies a whole new world. (85)   
The “whole new world” that Dryden refers to here is the third level of reality in the step-level 
theory of narrative history formation.  While Melville creates the narrator that is speaking to us 
through the pages, the narrator re-creates himself through the character of Ishmael, a character 
that we as readers must take at face value because we are given no objective information about 
him.  Melville gives all powers of creation to this narrator, but we cannot believe his version of 
reality because Ishmael, like Frankenstein, is a figment (narrator’s) of a figment (Melville’s) of 
imagination.  Again, Dryden refers to this idea without clearly delineating the concept of the 
third level: 
 At the time of writing, the narrator is called Ishmael precisely because he no longer plays 
the role identified by the name.  No longer actor but teller, he names himself in order to 
reveal that all names are pseudonyms.   
      By calling himself Ishmael, the narrator establishes his identity as a purely verbal one. 
(87) 
While “all names may be pseudonyms” in the sense that each of us is responsible for creating our 
own persona which eventually comes to be signified by our name, “Ishmael” differs because the 
narrator assumes a name which carries with it a preconceived Biblical persona outside of the 
narrator’s own personal experience.  Dryden connects Ishmael’s history with Gossman’s theory 
of the “present language event,” or signife, and the historical event, the signifier.  Because the 
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narrator exists on the secondary level of reality, but only exists to the reader as Ishmael on the 
third level, and no objective information about the secondary level is provided by the Author-god 
(Melville), Ishmael creates a reality based on a linguistic system of signifies that the reader has 
no knowledge of.  But, as Dryden tells us, because Ishmael does not believe in the existence of 
knowledge as dependent on the uncovering of factual evidence, the history based on linguistic 
signifies is not problematic.  For Ishmael, knowledge and reality depend on “a turning away from 
the factual world, a retreat into an imaginary reality where the only visible objects are literary 
ones, products of the imaginative realm they inhabit” (84).  In general, Ishmael’s history 
formation revolves in a cycle of literary and linguistic reality as opposed to physical reality.  But 
this is acceptable because as McSweeney tells us, Ishmael “knows that the keys to sympathetic 
identification lie in the reader’s imagination and memory” (44).  Ishmael says himself about his 
narrative that “without imagination no man can follow another into these halls” (160).  Because 
there is no first-level factuality or solid objective second-level information given by the Author, 
it is difficult for the reader to find a solid informational reference point on which to orient 
himself in the framework of Ishmael’s story, so faith and imagination become central to a 
“sympathetic identification.”   
     Like Mann’s ideal historian, Ishmael must fill in what he accepts as the factual chronology of 
events with a number of traditional literary conventions in order to provide the cohesive narrative 
chain that is necessary for giving meaning to the historical facts.  But because in this case the 
historical facts exist on the second level instead of the first, and according to Dryden, the world 
of the Pequod “is obviously a fictional one […].  [This] world, in other words, is a literary one, 
and [Ishmael’s history] can be understood only in this context” (90-1).  It is also only in this 
context that we can understand Ishmael’s literary persona. 
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     As briefly noted above, the name “Ishmael” appears to be an unusual signifier to represent the 
principle signife – the person who shipped on the Pequod and survived to tell the tale.  
According to Dryden, in Moby-Dick, “the reader is invited to share an experience with someone 
who apparently, for reasons of his own, has chosen to conceal his name behind an unlikely 
Biblical allusion” (85).  While Ishmael may be an obscure reference, the choice of pseudonym is 
not arbitrary.  There are numerous Biblical parallels throughout Ishmael’s narrative, none more 
obvious than the story of Jonah and the whale, and the Christian religion is a prominent 
component of the narrator’s personality.  Ishmael spends three chapters describing the chapel and 
the sermon that he hears in Nantucket before he ships out, and even claims that “the pulpit is 
ever the earth’s foremost part; all the rest comes in the rear; the pulpit leads the way […]. Yes, 
the world’s a ship on its passage out, and not a voyage complete, and the pulpit is its prow” 
(Melville 50).  Ishmael’s Christianity provides one of his most readily accessible extraliterary 
sources and presents itself as a possible link between himself and the reader because the 
Christian religion exists on the same primary level as the reader.  The narrator is pulling from a 
base of information that the reader has access to even if he or she does not share Ishmael’s 
knowledge of Christianity. 
     The significance of the assumption of Ishmael as a name relies on this connection because an 
understanding of the Biblical Ishmael can provide clues to the persona that the narrator wishes to 
adopt for the purposes of telling the story, which gives some idea of the narrator’s self-image.  
We can assume a reliable projection of the Biblical Ishmael onto the personality of the narrator 
because he uses other Biblical names for characters throughout the story and we can recognize a 
pattern of characterization between the Biblical and Moby-Dick-ian namesakes.  We can assume 
that the narrator understands the religious significance of the name Ishmael and has not renamed 
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himself arbitrarily because he recognizes the religious significance of the other Biblical names he 
uses.  Aside from Ishmael, the most prominent religious name in the narrator’s history is that of 
the monomaniacal Captain Ahab.  We know that the narrator recognizes the significance of 
Ahab’s name because when Peleg reminds him that Ahab of old was a king, Ishmael replies, 
“‘And a very vile one.  When that wicked king was slain, the dogs, did they not lick his blood?’” 
(80).  Because the name Ahab refers to a story which exists on the first level, we can validate the 
claims laid out on the third level by Ishmael, and we do see that in the Christian Bible, when 
Ahab dies “the dogs licked up his blood” (I Kings 22:38).   
     While it must be admitted that there is not a literal connection between every aspect of the 
Biblical Ahab and the captain of the Pequod, for Captain Ahab never has his blood licked by 
dogs, there are parallels between the two characters.  The Biblical Ahab was a “vile” and 
“wicked king” of Israel, but he also had moments of meekness and humanity.  In I Kings, after a 
prophet tells Ahab the Lord has decreed, “‘I will bring disaster on you.  I will consume your 
descendants and cut off from Ahab every last male in Israel” (21:21), Ahab humbles himself and 
fasts, which prompts the Lord to postpone his disaster.  Though Ahab’s wickedness eventually 
leads to his death, there are glimpses of humanity in him.  This is where we can see a parallel 
between the Biblical Ahab and Captain Ahab.  The captain of a ship is the equivalent to a king 
on land and in “The Cabin Table” chapter Ishmael refers to Captain Ahab as “King Ahab” (128).  
And while the degree to which Captain Ahab is inherently wicked is debatable, his unrelenting 
desire for revenge ultimately leads him and his entire crew to their destruction.5  However, like 
the Biblical Ahab, Peleg tells Ishmael: 
                                                 
6 For discussions of Captain Ahab’s malignity, see Henry Pommer’s Milton and Melville and Leslie Sheldon’s 
“Messianic Power and Satanic Decay: Milton in Moby-Dick.” 
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 “[…] [W]rong not Captain Ahab, because he has a wicked name.  Besides, my boy, he 
has a wife—not three voyages wedded—a sweet, resigned girl.  Think of that; by that 
sweet girl that old man has a child: hold ye then there can be any utter, hopeless harm in 
Ahab?  No, no, my lad; stricken, blasted, if he be, Ahab has his humanities!” (81) 
Here again we get a divergence between the Biblical Ahab and Captain Ahab in that King 
Ahab’s wife, Jezebel, is one of the most recognizably malicious women in literature or history 
and is one of the motivating influences on King Ahab’s wickedness, while Captain Ahab’s wife 
is supposedly a sweet woman who serves to ground Captain Ahab’s compassion.     
     The other readily identifiable Biblical name is that of a secondary character introduced in 
“The Prophet” chapter.  While this character does not play an essential role in the development 
of Ishmael’s history, he does support the assumption that the Biblical names give a first-level 
insight into the third-level characters.  In this chapter, a grizzled old seaman accosts Ishmael and 
Queequeg after they have signed to ship on the Pequod.  He concerns Ishmael with the story of 
Ahab’s first battle with the white whale and mentions the fact that the loss of Ahab’s leg 
occurred “‘according to the prophecy’” (89).  He makes an ominous statement about Ahab’s 
quest being “‘all fixed and arranged a’ready’” (90), and directly before Ishmael and Queequeg 
are to board for the voyage says, “‘I was going to warn ye against—but never mind, never 
mind—it’s all one, all in the family too’” (93).  Not only may this be a reference to the 
destruction of the Pequod’s crew-family, it also may be an allusion to the Biblical Elijah’s 
prophecy that God will consume Ahab’s descendants and destroy his house (I Kings 21:21-22).  
Ishmael, not wanting to encourage the man from speaking more but overcome with curiosity, 
learns that the man is named Elijah.  Ishmael’s recorded reaction to this is crucial: “Elijah! 
thought I, and we walked away” (90).  While he does not directly comment on the religious 
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significance of the name Elijah, the fact that he recorded an exclamation mark as indicative of 
his mental reaction tells us that he is aware of the meaning behind the name.  Indeed, when we 
return to the Biblical signife, we see that Elijah is not only a prophet, he is the same prophet that 
gave King Ahab the pronouncement from the Lord that his family would be destroyed.  
Therefore, not only are the lives of the Biblical Ahab and Elijah intertwined, the lives of the 
Ishmael-ian Ahab and Elijah are intertwined as well.  Accepting this, we can now look at the 
Biblical Ishmael in order to learn about the second-level narrator who is projecting his self-image 
through the Ishmael signifier. 
     Ishmael enters Judeo-Christian history in Genesis 16.  Because Abraham and his wife Sarah 
could not conceive a child, Abraham fathered a child with Sarah’s servant Hagar.  However, 
tensions arose between Sarah and Hagar while Hagar was pregnant and she fled.  According to 
Genesis 16:9, an angel of the Lord came to Hagar and told her to return to her mistress.  The 
angel goes on to tell her, 
 “You are now with child 
      and you will have a son. 
 You shall name him Ishmael, 
      for the Lord has heard of your misery. 
 He will be a wild donkey of a man; 
      his hand will be against everyone 
      and everyone’s hand against him, 
 and he will live in hostility 
      toward all his brothers.”  (16:11-12) 
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Abraham later prays on Ishmael’s behalf and gets God to reconsider: “‘And as for Ishmael, I 
have heard you: I will surely bless him, I will make him fruitful and will greatly increase his 
numbers’” (Genesis 17:20). 
     While we do not see much of the “wild donkey of a man” who does not get along with anyone 
in the Ishmael of Moby-Dick, we do get a sense that he is a societal cast-away.  He does admit 
that before he decides to ship off to sea, it often “requires a strong moral principle to prevent 
[him] from deliberately stepping into the street, and methodically knocking people’s hats off” 
(Melville 23).  It appears that Ishmael has at least the soul of a social outcast, and he insinuates 
that it is a common practice for him to go to sea.  It is his “pistol and ball” – his way of 
personally eliminating the frustrations of the world (Melville 23). 
     In keeping with the possible parallels between the Biblical and Melvillean Ishmaels, it is also 
significant that God specifically tells Abraham that he will bless Ishmael.  This could be part of 
the narrator’s reasoning behind the fact that he was the only member of the Pequod to survive 
Moby-Dick’s assault.  There are many religious figures whose  names the narrator could have 
used to serve his purpose: Job, whom Ishmael quotes in the Epilogue as saying, “‘And I only am 
escaped alone to tell thee,’” would have been an appropriate allusion (Melville 432).  And if the 
narrator did float for a day among the sharks that swam by “as with padlocks on their mouths” 
and the “savage sea-hawks [that] sailed with sheathed beaks,” surely the Biblical Daniel, who 
spent a night among lions with closed mouths, would have been a meaningful namesake (432).  
But the Lord’s blessing of Ishmael carries the same salvational significance; if the narrator was 
having a problem justifying his survival, it would not have been appropriate to use either Job or 
Daniel, two men who were both saved by their unfaltering devotion to their God.  Because 
Ishmael tells us that he takes to sea only as a way to prevent himself from lashing out at society, 
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it makes more sense to draw upon the connotations of Ishmael, the outcast re-welcomed into the 
fold, in the creation of his literary persona.  Because these connotations draw upon first-level 
information accessible to readers, we are given a means to connect with the narrator Ishmael 
despite the tremendous gap between the first and the third levels of reality. 
     Ishmael is aware of the connection that he provides by creating his persona with the help of 
first-level accessible information and realizes the value of objective information in regards to the 
degree in which it makes his story more believable.  Because of this, he interjects verifiable first-
level information throughout his entire narrative.  At face value, the events that occurred on the 
Pequod which inspired Ishmael to tell this tale are meaningless because they only exist, even as 
an objective chronology of events, on the second level of reality, and thanks to the total 
immersion narrative structure of Moby-Dick, the reader has no access to this information.  The 
only second-level information that can be taken as “objective truth” from the Author is the fact 
that the narrator was on the Pequod and was the only sailor rescued by the Rachel.  This 
information is acceptable by the reader only because there is the theoretical possibility that if we 
were granted the ability to exist on the second level with the narrator, we could then go and 
investigate Ishmael’s story; we could ask the crew of the Rachel if they did in fact meet the 
Pequod on its pursuit of the white whale and then later rescue a single man floating in the middle 
of the ocean on a coffin.  Because there is that theoretical avenue of verifiability, we trust that 
Ishmael is not lying to us.  However, everything else that occurred on the Pequod is eternally un-
verifiable because there are no other surviving members of the crew to validate Ishmael’s story.   
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Objectivity and Narrative Shifts in Ishmael’s History 
 
     While I will later argue that Chapter 25 concludes the first section of Ishmael’s actual 
narrative, there is an important structural shift that occurs Chapter 32, “Cetology.”  Here, for the 
first time, Ishmael begins to incorporate first level verifiable information into his increasingly 
subjective narrative in an attempt to validate himself as both a storyteller and an historian.  This 
is where we get the first real glimpse of the failure of Ishmael’s narrative to portray “what 
happened” as historical reality and his attempt to link his history to the actuality of the first level 
of reality.  Paul Lukacs, in “The Abandonment of Time and Place: History and Narrative, 
Metaphysics and Exposition in Melville’s Moby-Dick,” explains the shifts in narrative form 
throughout Moby-Dick by arguing that  
 Ishmael’s struggle as the narrator to make sense of what he experienced as a character is 
what leads to the radical changes in the book’s form.  Those changes do not signal a 
quarrel with fiction.  Instead, they signal a quarrel with narrative history—the 
chronological form supporting factual as well as fictional story-telling.  The expository 
middle third of the book, in which chapter after chapter Ishmael dissects both a whale and 
the business of whaling, exists in the present of his composition, not in the past of the 
Pequod’s sailing.  It not only divides his narratives, but also calls into question the 
assumption underlying them—namely, that a history that tells “what happened” can truly 
represent reality. (140) 
At the beginning of this Chapter 25, Ishmael grants, “Already we are boldly launched upon the 
deep; but soon we shall be lost in its unshored, harborless immensities” (116).  He turns to a 
familiar metaphor, going to sea, to explain the task he has undertaken.  By attempting to 
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reproduce a historical reality out of what is now a linguistic experience, Ishmael is embarking 
boldly upon the treacherous depths of reality.  In doing this, he knows that he must move away 
from objective physical reality out into the “unshored, harborless immensities.”  Without the 
theoretical objectivity to fall back on, he will be adrift with only his ship, literally and 
metaphorically the Pequod, to keep his historical reality above water.  Thus, in “Cetology,” 
Ishmael makes his first attempt to stay connected to objective reality by cataloguing the scientific 
truths behind his story.  By doing this Ishmael claims that he is providing information necessary 
to a “thorough appreciative understanding of the more special leviathanic revelations and 
allusions of all sorts which are to follow” (116), though he seems to be attempting to persuade 
his readers that the “harborless” history he is creating is believable because it incorporates 
verifiable information.  While the use of extraliterary facts are important to him, McSweeney 
contends that “‘natural verity’ is not an end for Ishmael; it is a means.  The facts are used to 
provide a basis and an authenticating context for the larger speculative issues in which he is 
passionately interested and in which he wants his audience to become interested in as well” (46).  
In order to further validate himself as a “truthful” narrator, Ishmael attempts to prove to the 
reader that he knows the subject of his story intimately.  And again, in proving that he is 
someone that can be trusted, Ishmael turns his third-level literary world over to the primary-level 
sources:  
It is some systematized exhibition of the whale in his broad genera, that I would now fain 
to put before you.  Yet it is no easy task.  The classification of the constituents of a chaos, 
nothing less is here essayed.  Listen to what the best and latest authorities have laid down. 
(116) 
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While Ishmael exists as a third level creation of the second-level narrator, the second-level 
narrator exists as a creation of the first-level Author.  Through the interconnected chain of 
knowledge that all three storytellers have, Ishmael does have access to this type of primary-level 
information, and this information is what can give the reader some insight into the reality that the 
narrator draws on for the creation of Ishmael and his history.   
     Ishmael admits that cataloguing whales is a monumental task that he is not above stepping 
away from and allowing people more qualified than he to step in and further his narrative when 
he cannot.  This again is an attempt to make himself seem trustworthy because if he is willing to 
cite other people when his own personal knowledge is insufficient, it stands to reason that when 
Ishmael does speak is it because he feels confident enough in his own narrative abilities.  
However, Ishmael never gains enough confidence in his narrative abilities to completely allow 
the history to revolve around his own voice; he repeatedly returns to the relative security of the 
expository form by explaining verifiable information about the business of whaling intermittedly 
through Chapter 125, “The Log and Line.”  After this Ishmael essentially removes himself 
completely from the history in order to capture the reality of the last few days of the Pequod.   
     One of the most significant uses of extraliterary sources defends Ishmael’s physical 
description of whaling scenes.  When describing what the whales look like for any readers who 
may not have ever seen one, Ishmael gives a brief summary of artistic whale images.  He begins 
by describing erroneous or “Monstrous Pictures of Whales” from ancient India and Egypt on up 
to 1836 (212).  He then provides a chapter on “The Less Erroneous Pictures of Whales, and the 
True Pictures of Whaling Scenes” (216).  In these chapters, Ishmael provides descriptions of 
actual paintings, and assesses each as a realistic portrayal of the majesty of the whale.  According 
to Ishmael, “the finest, though in some details not the most correct, presentations of whales and 
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whaling scenes to be anywhere found, are two large French engravings, well executed, and taken 
from paintings by one Garneray” (216).  Ishmael goes on to describe in great detail, and 
accurately, the two paintings by A.L. Garneray, both painted around 1835.  That these paintings 
exist as factual objects and Ishmael appears to have an intimate knowledge of them blurs the line 
between his literary reality and the reader’s physical reality, and enhances the appearance of his 
reliability. 
     Once Ishmael has provided a link between the third and first levels of reality and has 
convinced the reader to accept his narrative abilities, he must deal with the problem of 
believability in the story of a whale attacking a boat.  Ishmael is aware that many readers may 
express the same sentiments as Starbuck in “The Quarter-Deck” chapter: “‘Vengeance on a 
dumb brute!... that simply smote thee from blindest instinct! Madness!’” (139).  Ishmael is 
presented with the problem that readers may not believe that a whale would decide to 
maliciously attack a ship.  He understands this problem, and speaks to it directly:  
 But fortunately the special point I here seek can be established upon testimony entirely 
independent of my own.  That point is this: The Sperm Whale is in some cases 
sufficiently powerful, knowing, and judiciously malicious, as with direct aforethought to 
stave in, utterly destroy, and sink a large ship; and what it more, the Sperm Whale has 
done it. (171) 
It is significant that Ishmael is relieved that he can rely on independent testimony in order to 
validate the action he will describe in the forthcoming chapters.  He is concerned that his ability 
as both a rememberer and a historical re-creator is insufficient to carry the weight of the narrative 
on its own.  To justify his history and assert that the events he narrates could have occurred, 
Ishmael references many first-level actual historical occurrences of whales sinking or attacking 
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ships at sea.  But this reliance on primary-level information comes with a consequence.  Because 
Ishmael never comes to terms with his own narrative abilities and repeatedly returns to 
information about a world from which Ishmael is twice removed, his dependence on this material 
begins to hurt his believability.  It is stylistic overkill; it begins to seem as though Ishmael is 
attempting to compensate for some grievous lack by constantly referring to information that 
exists on a different level of reality as he.  In effect, Ishmael tries so hard to give his readers 
some verifiable information that he begins to highlight his own shortcomings as an objective 
narrator.  Dryden contends that “although anchored by the weight of its how-to-do-it material, 
[Moby-Dick] is always moving away from the objective or factual world and persistently calling 
attention to itself as fiction” (83).  By “how-to-do-it material,” Dryden is referring to all 
instances of Ishmael attempting to prove himself as a better informed observer by incorporating 
factual information about the whaling industry, from the “Etymology” and “Extracts” sections 
that precede the first narrative to “Cetology” to “Of the Monstrous Pictures of Whales” to the 
contrasting views of the Sperm and Right whale heads. 
     The first reference to actual attacks on whaleships by whales, concerning the Essex, is the 
most famous and is often assumed to be the “real” event behind the story of Moby-Dick.  But 
instead of Melville admitting that the story of the Essex inspired his composition, he allows 
Ishmael to cite the existence of the Essex story as a parallel event to the Pequod which, in theory, 
puts the two ships on the same level of reality and therefore should make both stories equally 
believable.  The sinking of the Essex, which occurred in 1820, would have been recognizable to 
Melville’s contemporaries, and by paralleling its story to the Pequod’s, Ishmael is attempting to 
insert his narrative into the canon of contemporary history.  The inclusion of first-level history 
gives a sense of reality to his story.  Ishmael provides a footnote to the Essex story where he 
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quotes sections from Owen Chace’s narrative, who was on the Essex when it was sunk by an 
angered sperm whale.  Interestingly, Ishmael claims that that he has not only read Chase’s 
account, but he claims to have “conversed with his son” (171).  Here Ishmael crosses the 
boundaries of his literary reality in a more direct way than by merely mentioning events that 
happen on the first level of reality; he is claiming to have personally interacted with people 
involved in this incident.   
     Ishmael does the same thing in reference to a story recorded in what he calls “Langsdorff’s 
Voyages,” but which is actually titled Voyages and Travels in Various Parts of the World by 
George H. von Langsdorff.  Ishmael cites chapter seven of this work, wherein Langsdorff tells of 
a ship, commanded by a Captain D’Wolf, being struck by an “‘uncommon large whale’” but 
sustaining no real damage.  While this tale may seem to be a rather inauspicious event to have 
included in his story, Ishmael oddly claims that he is a nephew of the aforementioned Captain 
D’Wolf.  Ishmael assures the reader that “I have particularly questioned [D’Wolf] concerning the 
passage in Langsdorff.  He substantiates every word” (173).  Not only is Ishmael claiming 
knowledge of information from the first level of reality that the reader also has access to in order 
to build a connection and sense of trust between himself and the reader, he is asserting himself as 
a part of that reality by claiming kinship to a “real” first-level person.  Even though Ishmael has 
consciously created his own literary persona through the Biblical allusions and, as we have seen 
Dryden claim, “establishe[d] his identity as a purely verbal one” (87), he takes steps to connect 
himself with the physical world of the reader.   
 
 
 
 44 
The “Narrative Present” and Problems of Knowability 
 
     One of the biggest problems for the objectivity of Ishmael’s history is that the actual sinking 
of the Pequod happened long before Ishmael decides to tell his story.  He begins his tale by 
saying, “Some years ago—never mind how long exactly…” (23).  But we must be concerned 
with how long ago because there is an aspect of objectivity that is lost through the passage of 
time.  The farther a person becomes temporally removed from the incident in question, the 
further that person moves from his or her physical experience of the event.  Recall that as soon as 
an event occurs it ceases to exist as a physical actuality and thereafter only exists in a linguistic 
form.  As time continues to pass, the connection to the physical world continually decreases until 
the only remnant of that event exists solely in a linguistic form and thus has no verifiable basis.  
Because years have passed since the sinking of the Pequod, we know that the history Ishmael 
creates only has a basis in the linguistic memory he has of the event.  And because the physical 
event as the narrator would have experienced it only has its physicality in the second level of 
reality, which for us is also inherently linguistic, the events are even harder for us to accept as 
reality.  Even with all of the objective proof that Ishmael provides in an attempt to persuade us 
that he is a reliable narrator, we remain aware of the increasingly subjective view of the events 
that arise with the passage of time. 
     When Ishmael begins to tell his story of the past, the act of telling it creates what Barry Marks 
calls the “’narrative present’ or the ‘writing time story’” (367).  Marks’ terms fit well into the 
step-level structure of literary reality because “the concept of the writing time story first implies 
that we recognize the narrator speaking to us as a fictional creation who in turn creates himself in 
the narrative past” (367).  Even though Ishmael attempts to obscure the fact that he is a fictional 
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creation by merging his identity with the first level of reality, the fact that we are reading about 
the narrator means that we are aware of the narrator as a constituent of the secondary level of 
reality, and thus know that he does not exist.  Therefore, we recognize that the history he tells us 
is the creation of a creation.   
     Ishmael desperately wants to portray his history as a reality, which is why he goes to the 
lengths that he does to connect himself with the verifiable first level of reality.  He faces the 
same problem that faces the first-level historian – the presentation of a chronology of events does 
not provide a sufficient understanding of history.  For Ishmael’s history, a verifiable chronology 
of events would read as follows: arrive at New Bedford, meet Queequeg, arrive at Nantucket, 
sign on for the voyage of the Pequod, ship out from Nantucket, get rescued by the Rachel three 
years later.  Each of these events are verifiable only if the reader can enter the second level of 
reality and retrace the narrator’s steps and ask the people involved if the history happened as 
Ishmael laid out.  Nothing on the Pequod is verifiable, so the sequence of events on board must 
be left out.  As is, this is a very sterile, and confusing, history.  Ishmael is forced to connect the 
gaps in the sequence of events with a narrative thread in order to provide some understanding of 
how and why his history happened as it did. 
     There is a necessity for Ishmael to create a narrative to string the events of his experience on 
the Pequod together. Barry Marks identifies and describes a shifting reliance on “historically 
accurate” conventions throughout Ishmael’s history and asserts that in the first part of Moby-
Dick, Ishmael “speaks clearly and simply and keeps a firm grasp on chronology” (372).  In other 
words, at the beginning of the novel Ishmael attempts to lay out a cohesive narrative to link 
together the verifiable events of his time at New Bedford and Nantucket.  And for the most part, 
he succeeds.  Paul Lukacs agrees with Marks’ idea that in the beginning, which Lukacs defines 
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as the first forty chapters, Ishmael seems to be telling a historically cohesive and plausible 
narrative because the narrative is his: “Yet while he moralizes, digresses, and speculates 
incessantly, his writing in the first forty chapters of Moby-Dick remains essentially narrative.  
That is, within those chapters he never stops telling his story” (142, my emphasis).  While 
Ishmael does provide dialogue between characters, which is one of the significant liberties the 
author of fiction will take that the historian will not, in the beginning the dialogue is only 
provided between characters with whom Ishmael is personally involved.  In doing this, Ishmael 
moves farther away from the work of the historian but tries to limit that distance by only dealing 
with events that he has directly witnessed.  At first, we only see verbal communication when 
Ishmael has direct access to the original communicative event.  For example, Ishmael does 
record the banter between Captains Peleg and Bildad on the deck of the Pequod, but he can do 
this because he was there to sign up for the voyage and so possibly overheard their discussion.  
Ishmael does not cross the boundary of the casual observer of the conversation, and while we 
may question his ability to retain the details of every conversation he relates, it is acceptable 
because he did have the personal experience of the event.  And like before, we can theoretically 
verify the conversation if we were granted the ability to exist on the secondary level.   
     While I agree with this understanding of what Ishmael is trying to do in the beginning of his 
history, I disagree with Lukacs’ delineation that the first section extends through Chapter 40.  
We must overlook certain structural problems if we understand the first 40 chapters as a 
continuous personal narrative.  Ishmael first breaks this continuity in Chapter 26, the first 
“Knights and Squires” chapter.  Here Ishmael begins to catalogue who is on the Pequod with 
him, and so sets the dramatis personae for his voyage.  He begins with Starbuck, the first mate, 
and while Ishmael describes Starbuck intimately, we can accept it because we understand that 
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Ishmael is writing about Starbuck after the fact, that is, after he has spent enough time to get to 
know him personally and possibly had time to research his origins.  However, about halfway 
through the chapter, Ishmael does something that he heretofore never attempted – he enters the 
mind of another character: 
 Starbuck was no crusader after perils; in him courage was not a sentiment; but a thing 
simply useful to him, and always at hand upon all mortally practical occasions.  Besides, 
he thought, perhaps, that in this business of whaling, courage was one of the great staple 
outfits of the ship, like her beef and bread; and not to be foolishly wasted.  Wherefore he 
had no fancy for lowering for whales after sundown; nor for persisting in fighting a fish 
that too much persisted in fighting him.  For, thought Starbuck, I am here in this critical 
ocean to kill the whales for my living, and not to be killed by them for theirs; and that 
hundreds of men had been so killed Starbuck well knew. (104, my emphasis) 
Ishmael is easing himself into the narrative conventions that will allow him to enter into the 
minds and conversations of the other members of the Pequod without abandoning the first-
person point of view that he established with the opening “Call me Ishmael.”   
     While this may not be a significant shift into an omniscient point of view, there is structural 
evidence that signifies a fundamental shift in Ishmael’s narration beginning with the twenty-sixth 
chapter.  In telling about his time in New Bedford and Nantucket, Ishmael attempts to portray his 
history in a historiographically acceptable form, but according to Lukacs, the fundamental issue 
of Ishmael’s narrative is the creation of history, and Ishmael is faced with the “necessity of 
choosing a discourse that grounds the representation of truth or life in the changing verities of 
time and place” (141).  But once the Pequod leaves Nantucket in the “writing-time story,” the 
verity of time and place is no longer groundable because everyone who could verify Ishmael’s 
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history is lost.  Therefore, Ishmael realizes that he must alter the narrative mode in which he 
presents his history – i.e. he must be able to enter the minds of his fellow crew and even of his 
captain in order to provide an understanding, or a history, of the events leading up to his rescue 
by the Rachel.  He signifies this shift in narrative mode in chapter twenty-five, aptly titled 
“Postscript.”  This signifies the end of Ishmael telling personal knowledge and his entrance into a 
literary world of conjecture and assumption – the world of the Pequod.  Ishmael specifically says 
this in the “Postscript” chapter: 
 In behalf of the dignity of whaling, I would fain advance naught but substantiated facts.  
But after embattling his facts, an advocate who should wholly suppress a not 
unreasonable surmise, which might tell eloquently upon his cause—such an advocate, 
would he not be blameworthy? (102) 
Ishmael effectively spreads out and sums up what he is about to undertake.  In another attempt to 
connect with the reader, he avows that he would not consider presenting anything but 
“substantiated facts” – the closest he can offer to objectivity – but after he presents the facts, it is 
his responsibility to offer some “not unreasonable surmise,” or a plausible explanation, for those 
facts.  In this short paragraph, Ishmael summarizes his idea of the work of the historian and 
justifies the narratorial leaps he is about to take.  Directly after this chapter comes the first 
“Knights and Squires” section, and the beginning of Ishmael’s omniscience.   
     This omniscience does not come as a complete surprise, however.  There are instances where 
the narrator intimates that he is not indelibly linked to his Ishmael persona.  When he enters the 
chapel in Chapter Seven, Ishmael sees the stone memorials of the unreturned whalers and 
remarks, “I regarded those marble tablets, and be the murky light of the darkened, doleful day 
read the fate of the whalemen who had gone before me.  Yes, Ishmael, the same fate may be 
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thine” (48).  Here the narrator briefly stops being Ishmael to become a secondary narrator who 
comments on the possible future.  This is problematic because this narrator is not omniscient if 
by “the same fate may be thine” indicates that this speaker does not know what happens on the 
Pequod.  This narrator has the knowledge of neither Melville’s original character nor Ishmael 
and indicates an early awareness on behalf of the narrator that he can step outside his Ishmael 
persona and exist as a narrator who is not limited by what Ishmael personally knows.  While 
some may see this narrative fluctuation as problematic, Henrik Nielsen does not.  In a 2004 essay 
“The Impersonal Voice in First-Person Narrative Fiction,” Nielsen claims that Moby-Dick as a 
whole “illustrates the fact that readers very willingly accept the continuous identity of the 
experiencing-I and narrating-I even when the narration cannot plausibly be understood as coming 
from the narrating-I” (138).  Though Nielsen’s twenty-first century readers may not have a 
problem accepting this, Melville’s contemporary readers surely did, which seems 
counterintuitive if one begins to read Ishmael as a nineteenth-century Transcendentalist. 
 
Ishmael’s “Transparent Eyeball” 
 
     In “Ishmael’s Equal Eye: The Source of Balance in Moby-Dick,” Beongcheon Yu recognizes 
the fluidity of the narrator’s persona and links it to the Emersonian philosophy of nineteenth-
century America.  Yu claims that by telling the reader to “Call me Ishmael” the narrator “echoes 
Emerson’s ‘the first person singular’ who finds that in nature ‘all mean egotism vanishes’ [and 
indicates] self-objectification or self-detachment” from the linguistically created Ishmael (113).  
While Yu is astute in linking Ishmael to Emerson, she stops short in her comparison of Moby-
Dick and “Nature.”  The passage that Yu parallels to Ishmael’s genesis presents us with a 
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tremendous insight into Ishmael’s narrative strategy: “Standing on the bare ground—my head 
bathed in the blithe air and uplifted into infinite space—all mean egotism vanishes.  I become a 
transparent eyeball; I am nothing; I see all; the currents of the Universal Being circulate through 
me; I am part or parcel of God” (Emerson 6).  Not only does Ishmael echo the Emersonian “first 
person singular” as Yu makes us aware, he becomes a manifestation of the “transparent eyeball” 
that sees all.  Remember that Ishmael takes to sea to “drive off the spleen” and soothe a troubled 
soul.  The sea is for the narrator what the woods are to Emerson, and Ishmael knows it.  He even 
provides a maritime rendition of the “Nature” passage cited above when he describes “absent-
minded young philosophers” who lose themselves while on watch on the mast-head: 
 […] [L]ulled into such an opium-like listlessness of vacant, unconscious reverie is this 
absent-minded youth by the blending cadence of waves with thoughts, that at last he loses 
his identity; takes the mystic ocean at his feet for the visible image of that deep, blue, 
bottomless soul, pervading mankind and nature; […] In this enchanted mood, thy spirit 
ebbs away to whence it came; becomes diffused through time and space; […]. (136) 
Ishmael here does not admit to becoming “part or parcel of God,” but he stops only just short of 
it.  His awareness of the concept of the transcendental consciousness is central to the 
understanding of Ishmael’s ability to enter into the minds of the crew after Chapter 25. 
     Edgar Dryden tells us that Ishmael not only recognizes the existence of the universal being, 
he becomes the creator of the Pequod’s universe.  In Chapter 26, Ishmael writes: 
 If, then, to meanest mariners, and renegades and castaways, I shall hereafter ascribe high 
qualities, though dark; weave round them tragic graces; if even the most mournful, 
perchance the most abased, among them all, shall at times lift himself to the exalted 
mounts; if I shall touch that workman’s arm with some ethereal light; if I shall spread a 
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rainbow over his disastrous set of sun; then against all mortal critics bear me out in it, 
[…]. (105) 
Here again Ishmael admits that he must abandon the narrative structure that he has relied upon 
until this point.  In providing a narrative that connects the facts of the Pequod’s disaster, Ishmael 
recognizes that he must invariably change the factual events to fit his historical narrative – he 
may be forced to “ascribe high qualities” to renegades, castaways, and trouble makers.  
Apparently he does this, because there do not appear to be any such men on the Pequod.  In this, 
Dryden tells us that it is Ishmael, not God, who “is the source of the divine ‘ethereal’ light and 
the creator of the rainbow” (89). 
     This view evidences the final ideological split between the narrator and Melville.  I argued 
above that in literature the Author acts as God in the creation of the second level of reality and as 
such has ultimate control over the reality of that world.  While Ishmael tells his narrative in the 
first part of the novel, even though it is he telling the story instead of Melville, Ishmael stays 
confined by the limits of physicality that can be imposed on him in the secondary level by the 
Author – that is, he exists by the same rules of knowledge and knowability as we do in our 
realm.  However, after Ishmael shifts into a floating narrative in the first “Knights and Squires” 
chapter, he no longer plays by the earlier rules of physical existence.   
     Early in the narrative shift, Ishmael is not completely comfortable in transcending his identity 
to explain the thoughts and actions of the Pequod’s captain and crew.  While Ishmael enters 
briefly into Starbuck’s mind in chapter twenty-six, he refrains from going into Stubbs’ in 
Chapter 27, “What he thought of death itself, there is no telling” (106), though he does provide 
information that he could not possibly know: “when Stubb dressed, instead of first putting his 
legs into his trousers, he put his pipe into his mouth” (106).  Ishmael continues this uncertain 
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dance with his omniscience until the next chapter, “Ahab,” when Ishmael gives us our first 
glimpse of the monomaniacal captain.  As if he is overwhelmed by the power and regality Ahab 
projects, Ishmael completely abandons his developing transcendent awareness and only gives us 
information about Ahab that he gathers either through personal experience or hearsay.  Ishmael 
gives a physical description of Ahab but offers no explanation about the facts of his appearance.  
About the scar running down Ahab’s face, Ishmael says, “whether that mark was born with him, 
or whether it was the scar left by some desperate wound, no one could certainly say” (110).  The 
only elucidation Ishmael provides about Ahab in this chapter comes from the old “Gay-Head 
Indian” who “had never before sailed out of Nantucket, [and] had never ere this laid eye upon 
wild Ahab” (110).  While Ishmael admits that this crewman had never seen Ahab before, he was 
recognized to have “preternatural powers of discernment” by the Pequod’s crew.  Ishmael seems 
to trust him and cites his claim about Ahab’s whale bone leg: “‘Aye, he was dismasted off 
Japan,” said the old Gay-Head Indian once; “but like his dismasted craft, he shipped another 
mast without coming home for it.  He has a quiver of ‘em’” (110).  It is telling that there is no 
qualification about the old Indian’s statement since Ishmael is relating this information after the 
fact, but the Indian appears to be wrong in this final pronouncement.  Ahab does not have a 
quiver of replacement legs – when one is broken he relies on the carpenter to make him a new 
one instead of retrieving one from his “quiver” (356).  It becomes obvious after the fact that this 
person is not reliable, but Ishmael does not negate his explanation in any way.  This is 
significant, and problematic, because here Ishmael knowingly accepts and incorporates 
obviously erroneous information into his “real” history. 
     Not long after this Ishmael returns briefly to his fleeting omniscience, but never makes an 
overt assertion that he is providing information that he could not have first hand knowledge of.  
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In the “Enter Ahab; To Him, Stubb” chapter, Ishmael gives the first account of a conversation 
that he was not directly a part of, but since the exchange between Ahab and Stubb occurred on 
deck, it is possible that Ishmael overheard the two and remembered it.  In the following chapters, 
“The Pipe” and “Queen Mab,” neither of which contain Ishmael as a character, the fact that the 
people involved are verbally speaking to each other gives Ishmael a small window of 
believability because he is still not entering into the minds of other characters.  While he is 
transgressing the rules of history formation by creating dialogue, there is the possibility that he 
could have overheard the people speaking.  Even Ahab’s philosophical musing in “The Pipe” is 
explained as soliloquizing, indicating that Ishmael could have overheard it.   
     However, once Ishmael gets to Chapter 36, he commits himself completely to the omniscient 
narrative role.  Like the “Postscript” chapter, “The Quarter-Deck” provides a structural 
indication that a fundamental narrative shift is about to occur.  This is the first chapter that 
includes stage directions, which has the odd effect of drawing the reader into the story by 
providing a feeling of the objective information that the Author can provide.  Recall that any 
information given directly to the audience from the Author, especially concerning the setting, 
can be assumed to be objective information because the Author acts as God in the literary realm 
he creates.  Because Ishmael has told us he has created a literary world, and as Dryden tells us it 
is Ishmael who is the source of divine light, on board the Pequod, he therefore assumes the role 
of God for this world and can provide us with seemingly objective information.  We believe 
Ishmael that this scene begins with Ahab mounting the quarter-deck followed by his crew: 
“Enter Ahab: Then all” (136).  Once we accept this image, we are more susceptible to believing 
the story that Ishmael gives us.  Furthermore, the stage directions break the past tense of 
Ishmael’s story to set up what Glauco Cambon calls the “historical present, whereby the author 
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who is telling his story of past events suddenly adopts a present tense to bring home to his 
audience the poignancy of some particular event relived now” (522).  This is different from the 
“writing time story” explained by Lukacs because the “historical present” recreates the acts as 
physical events in the now-present while the writing time story is defined by the present act of 
telling about the events.  For example, the stage directions cited above create the action in the 
present tense; the reader is transported temporally to the action described by the stage directions 
and witnesses them unfolding in real-time.  The scenes carrying these stage directions are the 
most poignant and important scenes thus far for Ishmael’s explanation of the events on the 
Pequod – they are the first real glimpses that we get into the minds of the principle characters: 
Ahab, Starbuck, and Stubb.  Once Ishmael brings the reader into his world and makes him 
connect with the poignancy of the scene, the omniscient point of view becomes easier to accept. 
     However, the extent of Ishmael’s omniscience is not realized until the next chapter, “Sunset.”  
Here again Ishmael provides us with preliminary italicized stage directions to draw us into the 
scene: “The cabin; by the stern windows; Ahab sitting alone, and gazing out” (142).  We are not 
only drawn into Ahab’s inner sanctum, a place Ishmael is never permitted, we enter directly into 
Ahab’s mind.  Ishmael disappears into the Universal Being completely, and Ahab’s is the only 
voice the audience is given: 
 I leave a white and turbid wake; pale water, paler cheeks, where’er I sail. […]. The diver 
sun—slow dived from noon—goes down; my soul mounts up! she wearies with her 
endless hill.  Is, then, the crown too heavy that I wear? this Iron Crown of Lombardy.  
Yet it is bright with many a gem; I, the wearer, see not its far flashings; but darkly feel 
that I wear that, that dazzlingly confounds.  ‘Tis iron—that I know—not gold. […]. The 
path to my fixed purpose is laid with iron rails, whereon my soul is grooved to run. (142) 
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By going directly into Ahab’s mind, Ishmael gives us the first “not unreasonable surmise” about 
Ahab’s soul and the mental struggle between his desire for revenge and the responsibility he has 
to his crew.  But ultimately Ishmael succeeds in showing us that no matter what may occur in the 
future, Elijah was correct in his prophecy that “‘it’s all fixed and arranged a’ready’” (90).   
     In the next chapter, “Dusk,” Ishmael remains invisible and enters the thoughts of Starbuck.  
Again we are given the stage directions to orient us in the historical present: “By the Mainmast; 
Starbuck leaning against it” (143).  Ishmael is still invisible, and we are only given Starbuck’s 
voice in the first person: “My soul is more than matched; she’s overmanned; and by a madman! 
[…].  I think I see his imperious end; but feel I must help him to it” (143).  Just as with Ahab, 
Starbuck is given his own voice in order to establish a plausible explanation for his actions later 
in the story.  He is the principle force against Ahab, the one who attempts to disconnect Ahab 
with his blind vengeance and reaffirm in him the responsibility to bring the crew home safely.  
Ishmael, as a member of the crew, is aware of Starbuck’s unease about Ahab’s quest, which was 
made clear in “The Quarter-Deck”: “‘Vengeance on a dumb brute!’ cried Starbuck, ‘that simply 
smote thee from blindest instinct!  Madness! To be enraged with a dumb thing, Captain Ahab, 
seems blasphemous’” (139).  Ishmael is faced with the necessity of explaining the events, and so 
must fall back upon his authorial right of omniscience in order to provide a plausible reason.  
According to Cambon, Ishmael’s omniscience does not create a problem in the literary world of 
the Pequod because “in this perspective, Ahab’s, Starbuck’s, and the other crew members’ asides 
do not lose plausibility; they are the conjuring narrator’s imaginative reconstruction of the 
characters he knew” (522-3). 
     Ishmael remains invisible for the next short chapter, where we again get a first-person musing 
by Stubb that reads, as do the previous two chapters, like a Shakespearian monologue.  Then the 
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“transparent eyeball” turns its gaze below decks to where the majority of the crew is gathered.  
Again, we are greeted with the stage directions to ground us in the historical present, but instead 
of focusing on the identity of one character, it presents us with a narrative in the form of a 
written drama.  Each character is given voice only after they are identified: “1st Nantucket 
Sailor”, “Dutch Sailor”, “French Sailor”, “2nd Nantucket Sailor”, etc.  While it is this chapter that 
first introduces us to Pip, who plays an important role in Ishmael’s history later on, there is not a 
pressing reason to include this “drama” chapter.  While we do get a glimpse into the interaction 
of the common crew, there is no deep insight into any one personality as in the three monologue 
chapters preceding it.  Marks argues that the “primary function of such [drama] passages is to 
show Ishmael the narrator, as a part of the action of the writing-time story, passing through 
moments of furious repression as he tries with desperate self-consciousness to get rid of self-
consciousness” (370). 
     During these passages we get the first glimpse into one of the most enigmatic and important 
characters in terms of understanding Ishmael’s destruction of self-consciousness, Pip.  Ishmael 
briefly introduces Pip in the second “Knights and Squires” chapter, but we learn more about him 
in last of the first series of drama passages.  At the end of the scene, when the sailors rush to man 
the sails in the face of the oncoming squall, Pip is left behind to hide and comment on what 
happens.   Like Ishmael, Pip becomes lost as a member of the Pequod’s crew and disappears into 
the rigging only to observe what is going on around him.   
     After this brief introduction, Pip disappears completely in the narrative for almost a third of 
the book, only to reappear in Chapter 93, “The Castaway.”  Pip leaps from the chase-boat he is 
on and is left alone in the sea until the Pequod chances by and rescues him.  After this incident, 
Pip is markedly changed.  He becomes a prophet of sorts for the Pequod and is the only member 
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of the crew who can both exclaim to Ahab’s face the problems of his quest and cause Ahab to 
connect with his lingering humanity.  In his new role, Pip is the “idle but unresting eye” who 
speaks the truth upon the Pequod.  He was granted this sight when, alone on the ocean, 
 the sea had jeeringly kept his finite body up, but drowned the infinite of his soul.  Not 
drowned entirely, though.  Rather carried down alive to wondrous depths, where strange 
shapes of the unwarped primal world glided to and fro before his passive eyes; and the  
miser-merman, Wisdom, revealed his hoarded heaps; and among the joyous, heartless, 
ever-juvenile eternities, Pip saw the multitudinous, God-omnipresent, coral insects, that 
out of the firmament of waters heaved the colossal orbs.  He saw God’s foot upon the 
treadle of the loom, and spoke it. (321-22) 
If anyone had recourse to understand Pip’s revelation on the sea it is Ishmael, who actually 
spends longer adrift alone on the “firmament of waters.”  Edgar Dryden claims that aside from 
Pip, Ishmael is the only character in the whole of Moby-Dick who is “concerned with the 
speaking of truth” (105).  Pip’s awareness of truth comes though the glimpse he has of the inner 
workings of God, the “foot upon the treadle of the loom,” which is seen as madness by the rest of 
his crew.  Some argue that truth and madness cannot be distinguished when one becomes 
entangled in what Kierkegaard calls the “God-relationship, [wherein] it is quite impossible to 
distinguish madness from truth.  This is so because, according to Kierkegaard, ‘truth is 
subjectivity,’ and therefore can only be defined objectively in terms that are uncertain and 
paradoxical” (Hartstein 35).  Ishmael attempts to define truth by abandoning the self-
consciousness in the manner described by Pip’s descent into “madness.”  But rather than accept 
his own madness as an expression of truth, Ishmael attempts to objectify his truth through 
integrating factual information while abandoning his own personal conscious experience. 
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Ishmael at the End 
 
     We see Ishmael returning to his struggle against self-consciousness again, as the above 
examples are not the only instances where Ishmael casts aside his crew-identity in order to 
provide information that only the transcendent Universal Being could have access to.  The 
objective stage directions return in Chapter 108, which is also organized like the script of a 
drama between Ahab and the Carpenter.  They only speak after they are recognized by the 
narratorial playwright, and the only action of the scene is explained through the italicized stage 
directions.  The stage directions again return in chapters 120-122, 127, and 129.  It is significant 
that the stage directions return with such frequency after chapter 119 – “The Candles.”  Glauco 
Cambon tells us that  
 after “The Candles” […] Ishmael will no longer assert his presence as an actor as in 
Chapter One, or as remembering actor-spectator as in Chapter 41, but will stay in the 
background, practically disappearing in his narration until the epilogue of the shipwreck 
sees him come to the surface again in objective shape, a survivor in Queequeg’s coffin. 
(521) 
 Cambon is correct; after the first round of drama chapters, the narrator begins Chapter 41 by 
reasserting himself as Ishmael: “I, Ishmael, was one of that crew; my shouts had gone up with 
the rest” (149).  He connects himself with the literary reality of the Pequod after having removed 
himself from it for the previous chapters and reclaims the role of both character and narrator.  
However, after Chapter 119, Ishmael disappears until after the Pequod has gone down and 
Ishmael has spent almost a full day drifting asea.  Not only does Ishmael disappear after “The 
Candles,” he completely denies his existence as a viable character in the story, refusing to even 
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mention his own name.  In “The Chase—Third Day,” the narrator describes three members of 
Ahab’s chase-boat crew being tossed overboard by Moby-Dick:  
As it was, three of the oarsmen—who foreknew not the precise instant of the dart, and 
were therefore unprepared for its effects—these were flung out; but so fell, that, in an 
instant two of them clutched the gunwale again, and rising to its level on a combing 
wave, hurled themselves bodily inboard again; the third man helplessly dropping astern, 
but still afloat and swimming. (429) 
While the major characters (Ahab, Starbuck, the Parsee) are named in the final chapters, the 
three oarsmen remain faceless members of the Pequod’s ill-fated crew.  However, in the 
Epilogue, we learn that the one oarsman fated to fall astern and so not return to the boat was 
none other than Ishmael himself:   
It so chanced, that after the Parsee’s disappearance, I was he whom the Fates ordained to 
take the place of Ahab’s bowsman, when that bowsman assumed the vacant post; the 
same, who, when on the last day the three men were tossed from out the rocking boat, 
was dropped astern. (432) 
By removing himself from the action of the final chase, Ishmael finally overcomes the problem 
of self-consciousness that Barry Marks claims he struggles with throughout his narrative.  Being 
only the story-teller instead of a character story-teller grants Ishmael the objectivity in the 
narrative that he previously only achieved through the drama sections.  The final chapters 
witness the culmination of Ishmael’s attempts to make the readers believe in his history – they 
are the final result of the catalogues, the “how to do it” material, and the troublesome 
intermingling of the first and third levels of reality that Ishmael embarks on.  Lukacs argues that 
the reality Ishmael creates by the end of the book “is not at all a product of his imagination.  
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Instead, it is a part of history, and in presenting it he writes from a point of view that is confined 
by the changing verities of time and place” (154).  The final embracing of an omniscient 
narrative mode exemplifies Ishmael’s final movement away from the limitations of his second-
level self.  That the final omniscient point of view is “confined by the changing verities of time 
and place” is not problematic because the time and place are constantly changing their positions 
on the continuum of reality.  The only point of view that can readily accommodate the shift in 
“true” time and place is the final omniscience. 
     Glauco Cambon, however, finds problems with this argument and asserts that the “repeated 
modal shifts make for an instability of point of view which prompts some critics to discount 
Ishmael as a realized and consistent actor-spectator, and to consider him as a mere narrative 
device Melville feels free to disregard as he sees fit” (517).  However, we cannot look upon 
Ishmael only as a narrative device because by doing so we limit the interpretive possibilities of 
Moby-Dick.  While my reading in no way claims to invalidate metaphorical readings of the 
novel, I do see it as unfortunate if modern readers refuse to accept Ishmael’s narrative as his 
attempt to come to terms with his past.      But even so, it should not be forgotten that Ishmael is 
the narrator’s constructed identity and Ishmael’s experience on the Pequod is not the narrator’s 
experience on the Pequod.  It is the experience that the narrator relives in an attempt to come to 
terms with that history. 
     Ultimately, while the narrator does embody Golo Mann’s ideal historian who tells a history as 
a “later, better informed observer” (7), what he creates through his Ishmael persona is not an 
acceptable version of historical reality.  It is a story about his past that attempts to explain the 
events of that past.  This is not to say that his story is not useful as a historical supplement, 
however.  As the narrator becomes self-aware throughout the creation of his narrative, history 
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alone cannot always succeed in providing enough information to make a problematic history 
acceptable in terms of the narrator’s coming-of-age.  In this light, the Pequod can still be seen as 
a metaphor, but that metaphor must include Melville’s attempt to show how one person adrift in 
the incessant current of social change deals retrospectively with the traumatic experience of 
surviving the social turmoil that easily and impersonally destroys many of the people swept 
along with it.      
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Diagram 1: Second Level of Reality 
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Diagram 2: Third Level of Reality 
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Diagram 3: God and the Levels of Reality 
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